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The Directorate of Personnel Management at the Office of 
t he Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) establishes 
the Army's future personnel needs and sets the Oepartment of 
the Army (DA) accession mission for the United states Army 
Recruiting command (USAREC). Recently, DCSPER accession 
planners have had difficulty in assigning the appropriate 
accession mission due to the large number of losses during the 
first term. The first term begins when a solider enters his 
basic mi li tary training and continues until his initial 
contract period is completed. Attempts to explain these 
attrition rates have focussed around USAREC's Delayed Entry 
Program (DEP) management. The DEP serves a variety of roles 
for USAREC and is used as an inventory system of recruits 
which acts to smooth out the seasonal fluctuations in demand 
for soldiers. 
This study investigates the relationship between the time 
an individual spends in the DEP and the risk of becoming a 
loss during the Initial Entry (lET) period. The lET consists 
of basic and advanced individual training and accounts for the 
first four to six months of Army life. Furthermore, it 
explores which enl istment factors are the most significant in 
exp l aining lET attrition. 
,i 
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The mission of the United States Army Recruiting Command 
(USAREC) is to recruit soldiers for today's Army. The use of 
the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) in processing enlistments for 
the Army has been an increasingly popular recruiting 
mechanism. The DE? allows potential recruits to contract for 
enlistment in specific occupational training as much as 12 
months in advance of their actual shipping or accession dates. 
DEP pools are critical because they act as an inventory from 
',;hich both the Directorate of personnel management for the 
Deputy chief of Staff of Personnel (DCSPER) and USAREC plan 
future accession missions. 
Recently, DCSPER accession planners have had difficulty 
in assigning the appropriate accession mission due to the 
large number of losses during the first term. The first term 
begins when a soldier enters his basic military training and 
continues until his initial contract period is completed. 
Attempts to eXplain these first term attrition rates have 
focused around USAREC's Delayed Entry Program (DEP) 
management. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A concern of the U.S. Army is the attrition rate for 
lnitial Entry Training (IET) soldiers. IET consists of basic 
i, 
and advanced individual training and normally last between 
four to about six months and thus may be shorter than the 
first term. 
C. APPR01l.CH 
The objective of this thesis is to study the relationship 
between the time an individual spends in the DEP and the risk 
of becoming an lET loss and which factors are most important 
in exploring lET attrition. The approach taken in this thesis 
is to begin with a detailed exploratory analysis followed by 
a more formal statistical analysis. The formal analysis 
involves attempting to fit a logistic regression model where 
the binary response variable indicates whether the individual 
was an lET loss or not and the exploratory variables include 
age of enlistee, AFQT score, enlistment bonus, combat arms 
MOS, gender, education level, race, and time in the DEP. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The dramatic increase in first-term attrition observed 
over the past few years was not seen for lET attritions. In 
fact, lET attritions have decreased slightly over the past two 
years. The time a potential recruit spends in the Delayed 
Entry Program is not as important to lET attrition as 
expected. Although, in general, most groups that have higher 
attrition rates tend to spend less time in the DEP. For 
almo~t every category at: recruit, lET attrition rates are 
lowest for cohorts spending between six to eight months in the 
DEP. 
Recruits who accept enlistment bonuses are more likely to 
attrite than those who do not accept bonuses. whites have 
higher attrition rates than any of the other races, although 
for blacks, attrition rat(]s have been increasing over the past 
f o ur years. Females have higher attrition rates than males 
but exhibit similar distributions for DEP time. Enlistees who 
score above 60 on their AFQT have a much greater chance of 
completing lET than someone who sco red lower than 60. 
Combat Arms MOS's have an overall lower average attrition 
rate and longer average DEP lengths although the trend for the 
l ast two years has been the opposite. Finally, there are many 
factors related to enlistment like AFQT score, gender and 
education level which explain more about predicting lET 






A concern of the U.S. Army is the attrition rate for 
Initial Entry Training (lE'l') soldiers. lET consists of basic 
and advanced individual training and normally last about six 
months. These soldiers are leaving during their first term of 
service at an alarming rate. The first term begins when a 
soldier enters his basic military training and continues unti l 
his initial contract period is completed. The first term can 
be shorter than l ET. This is one of the issues which face the 
Directorate of Personnel Management at the office of the 
Deputy chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). This 
directorate establishes the Army's future personnel needs and 
sets the Department of the Army (DA) accession mission for the 
United states Recruiting Command (USAREC). 
Although DCSPER's personnel management section assigns 
the accession requirements for USAREC, the two organizations 
focus on two aspects_ of meeting the needs of the Army. 
USAREC's recrui ting approac h is designed to meet monthly 
quotas providing recruits with specific qualifications at 
specific time periods. However, it is D.2.t responsible for a 
contract after the accession date. On the other hand, 
DCSPER'S concern is with filling the authorized troop levels, 
and it focuses on soldiers who have entered the Army after 
their accession date. 
Due to the ongoing downsizing of the Army and the ever 
increasing budget cuts, USAREC has been experiencing a "tough" 
recrui ting market. The tough market has made i t even more 
difficult fo r recruiters and USAREC to meet their accession 
requirements. Recruiters may sometimes rush into signing a 
contract before the individual has had a chance to be trained 
in the DEP just to satisfy the monthly accession require ments 
{Ref.1}. This lowers the chance a contract might be lost in 
the DEP, more commonly called a "DEP loss". The result of 
this recruiting method is a decrease in the average time a 
recruit spends in the DEP. 
The average t ime spent in the DEP decreased cons iderab l y 
from FY 1992 to FY 1993 {Ref.2}. At the same time, the first-
term loss rate increased dramatically {Ref. 2}. The DEP 
pattern seen in FY 1993 allows USAREC to more easily meet 
their quotas, but causes some major problems for the DCSPER. 
One of the more important of these problems comes when 
planners are forecasting troop strengths and filling basic 
training seats. 
This thesis will investigate if the time a contract 
spends in the DEP has a significant effect on lET attrition. 
Additionally, this thesis will investigate the effects of 
other factors such as gender, educational status, age, ruce, 
enlistment conus, AFQT score, and chosen MOS on TET 
uttrition. 
The mission of the USAREC is to recruit soldiers for 
today's Army. The use of the DEP in processing enlistments 
for the Ar:rry has been an increasingly popular recruiting 
mechanism. The DEP allows potential recruits to contract for 
enlistment in specific occupational training as much as 12 
t:1onths in advance of their actual shipping or accession dates. 
DEP pools are critical because they act as an inventory from 
which both DCSPER and USAREC plan future accession missions. 
The DEP has many posi ti ve effects for the Army's 
personnel planners and for recruiters. It enables the Army to 
complete required background investigations on recruits. It 
allows planners to maintuin a level training load at basic 
training locations. It gives recruiters the opportunity to 
train their prospects at least once il month, ensuring that 
DEPers maintain their physical and :rrental qualifications tor 
enlistment, and that they sustain their desire to enlist. 
Finally, DEP offers potential recruits the opportunity to 
consider their choice and to prepare for the change to 
t:1ilitary life. Previous studies demonstrate that a large DEP 
'Military Operational Skill (MOS) is the oCCupational 
skill which each individual chooses upon enlisting in the 
pool of contracts may indeed promote recruiting {Ref. 3}. This 
is due to promotion incentives extended to DEPers for 
contributing referrals. 
There are also disadvantages to using the DEP. For 
instance, USAREC PAE analysts claim that the longer a recruit 
rema i ns in DEP, the higher the possibility that he or she wil l 
become a loss {Ref .1}, a term used to describe a recruit who 
reneges on his or her contract. In fact, USAREC estimates 
that about 15% of all recruits become DEP losses {Ref.l}. 
USAREC has put a considerable amount of effort into reducing 
the cost of DEP losses, and have commissioned many studies 
{Ref.4-6} to analyze the factors which affect DEP losses. 
Most recently, Vales {Ref.7} estimated the probability that an 
individual would access given the time he had survived in the 
DEP. Another study by Burris {Ref.a} looked at DEP loss as a 
function of the number of recruits contracted to be in the 
DEP, and developed an optimization model to assist USAREC 
analysts in setting their monthly recruiting goals. 
Considering the recruiting cost of roughly $5000 per recruit, 
and the increasing demand for budget reductions, it seems 
logical to try and minimize DEP losses by decreasing the time 
a recruit spends in the DEP. 
Although DEP losses are a major concern for USAREC, 
losses after a person enters the Army are more costly and 
directly contribute to future personnel shortages. First Term 
attrition rates during the last six months of FY93 reached an 
all time high, prompting inquiries from the DeSPER directed at 
identifying the attrition causes. The first term begins when 
a soldier enters his basic military training and continues 
until his initial contract period is conpleted. These 
inquiries identified that the decrease in average time spent 
in the DEP by incoming recruits might ha.ve a causal 
rela.tionship with the high attrition rates. In an attenpt to 
identify factors related to attrition, DA has sponsored many 
research efforts. One of the more prominent studies {Ref.9} 
presented a theoretical discussion of enlistnent and first-
term attrition decisions. It examined both enlistment and 
six-month attrition decisions as ""ell as enlistment and 35-
month attrition decisions in an attempt to discover whether 
variables governing an individual's willingness to enlist also 
affect his likelihood of attrition. The results of the study 
showed that some enlistment variables are determinants of 
attrition. Foremost were high school senior versus high 
school graduate status and positive versus negative education 
expectations. The study went on to say that another key 
indicator of attrition was the months spent in the DEP because 
this indicated that an enlistee was a good planner and was 
less likely to be disappointed with life in the military. 
Additionally, longer DEP queues are associated with more 
valuable military occupations and tend to offer more valuable 
training in the civilian sector, which act collectiVely to 
reduce attrition. 
Recently, Matos {Ref. 10} investigated the relationship 
between the time an individual spends in the Navy's DEP and 
the risk of becoming a DEP loss. Matos also looked at the 
time an individual spends in DEP and the risk of becoming a 
boot camp (the Navy's equivalent to the Army basic training) 
loss, or an in-service (the first two years of Navy l ife) 
loss. His research determined that the time an individual 
spends in the DEP has a la rger effect on attrition during the 
DEP than it does on attrition after the contract accesses, 
which is expected. This research effort is simi lar to the 
studies mentioned above in that it tries to identify which 
variables of an enlistment contract affect Army attrition 
rates. It differs from any of the previously mentioned 
studies in that we concentrate on attrition in the lET period 
and attempt to determine an optimal time an indiv i dual should 
participate in DEP to maximize his chances of continuing his 
military service career. Add i tionally, it investigates the 
effects of variables, such as enlistment bonus, which have not 
been examined previously. 
SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on active duty personnel who have 
failed to meet the minimum requirements during lET. Since 
losses during the lET phase cost considerably more to manage 
than the DEP, it is critical that the DEP be managed 
efficiently, and that the personnel entering lET have a higher 
propensity for fulfilling their contracts. 
There are many factors which deternine how DeSPER's 
personnel management section assigns the accession 
requirenents for USAREC. Recently attention has been focused 
on the increasing percentage of first-term attrition. The 
first-term starts when an individual is shipped to basic 
t r aining, and continues until contract completion. The first 
term begins when a soldier enters his basic military training 
and continues until his initial contract period is completed. 
This study will focus on attrition during the period referred 
to as Initiil.l Entry Training (IET), which may be shorter than 
the first term. 
The DCSPER manpower section uses a detailed computer 
based system to track market trends and predict the accession 
mission for the Army. This system, called the Cohort 
Targeting System, statisticallY explored factors which may be 
affecting early attrition. The one factor, identified most 
clearly by the system, is that average DEP lengths have 
decreased significantly between FY 1992 and FY 1993. 
Since many of USAREC and DCSPER's concerns revolve around 
budget, it is interesting to compare the cost of the lET loss 
with that of a DEP loss. Because an IET loss occurs later in 
the military career cycle, greater costs are associated with 
The cost of losing a soldier during IET ranges from 
$7500 to over $10,000 per soldier, whereas a new recruit lost 
in the DEP is approximately $5000. Clearly it seems that 
eliminating a possible lET loss candidate prior to the 
accession date would save the Army a great deal of money. 
O. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II given an overview of the data sets used for 
the research. Chapter III describes the preliminary analysis 
used to determine the relevant variables for model fitting. 
Chapter IV covers the methodology and final ana lysis used to 
create the Logistic Regression Model and gives the results. 
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations from 
the study. 
II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
comparing the attrition data with the DEP involves two 
large and separate data sets. The DEP data originates from 
the USAREC Mini-master files and encompasses accession 
statistics from 1987 to 1993. The attrition data orig inates 
:trom the Army Tra i ning Requirements and Resource System 
(A'I'RRS) which tracks lET soldiers from Basic Training through 
AlT. The key element or variable which allows the two data 
sets to be cross referenced and eventually matched is the 
Social Security Number (SSN). 
RECRUITING DATA 
The Mini-master file is one of the pr i mary sources from 
which the analysts at t he ~lissioning Division of the Program 
Analysis and Evaluation (PAE) Directorate of USAREC compute 
trends in the recruiting market. These analysts are 
responsible :tor ensuring that USAREC fulfills the DA accession 
mission. They must use the available statistical tools to 
predict trends, and account for losses in the DEP. A USAREC 
PAE analyst wil l spend hours each day, manipulating these data 
files to set quarter l y recruiting goals for the recruiters, 
and perform any other ana lysis which the headquarters so 
desires. 
A total of 547,110 records were provided from USIIRRC for 
t his study. Tabl e I describes a subset of the variablps for 
1988 and late r Mini-master database records and gives fHrther 
explanation as to the meaning of each variable name. 
variables listed in the left column of Table I were de t O?rmined 





Social Security Number 
Accession Date, The date an enlistef"' 
leaves the OF;P and enters BT 
Actual Time (Months) in the DEP 
Mission Box Designation, GiVes educi'ltion 
level, service history, gender, and IIFQ'i" 
The Military operation Skill which tl\l' 
enl istee chose 
Age in Years when enlistee signs 
contract 
1,--------4--------~----~~~--~ -­
Race of enlistee, W_ WhitejCaucasian, RAC E 




Request Army College Fund Taker, did -t~ 
enlistee chose to partici pa te in the 
ACF? YIN 
Male or Fema l e __ 
Request Bonus Taker, whether the 
individui'll signed for an enl istment 
bonus or not 
/0 
to be the mu s::: relevant for this research based ~:m 
CO:1versat. i ons with USAREC a na l y st-s. 
ATTRITION DATA 
The Army Trai rn:lg Resource Requirerr.ents Sy s tem call o n l y 
be accessed from :::emote terminaJ s by aut!lorize::i Army 
personnel . This makes gat- hering the da La difficult at best- . 
S ~ n c e t he AT:<'RS iiJ a l'elatively new syst em . t he da ta starts 
w:.. th FY 1990 a t trit i. on re ~o:::"ds a nd ~ollta i ns attrition 
stat ::'stics u p to the present. The ATRRS is somewhat limited 
i n that O:1ce rtn individ:ual gradua t-es f rom TET, hi s act-ive 
r ecor::i is t:::"a n sferrec1 t o il different da taba~e system. A s a 
r esu lt , obtaining a t tri t ion s tatistics beyond : ;:;: '1' becomes an 
even more det a~ _ Led i ssue. Table II gives some insight i nto 
the var i et y of information obta i. ned by accessing the A':'RRS. 




DS C3 COD 
SSN 
Description 
Code for the sr.hool enrol led 
in when the cohort a t trited 
Course :>iumber for TET 
Discharqe Code : ~,,:,hru L I 
(S-ee Tan l e -'-Vi 
Fisca l Year o f Separation 
So c ia l Security Nurnbe r 
The ATRRS provided over 28,000 attrition records starting in 
F'Y 1990 and including all of FY 1993. 
The Mini-master data file includes records from 1988 
through 1993, whereas the ATRRS data file only records files 
since 1990. Th is l imited the scope of the study to four 
years, FY 1990 to FY 1993. Table III gives a complete 
summary of the total number of records used in the study. 
Of the 28,696 records from ATRRS, 28,174 records were 
matched with the Mini-master file. 
Table III DATA SUMMARY 
TOTAL TOTAL lET 
ACCESSIONS ATTRITION RECORDS ATTRITION 
RECORDS USED 
88,071 7,069 220 6849 
91 77,121 7,515 128 
92 76,121 6,719 6664 
93 74,603 7,389 119 7270 
ALL 316,524 28,696 522 28174 
The 522 unmatched records, less than two percent of the 
total, were not fel t to be detrimental to the study. 
12 
III. DATA ANALYSIS 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
A crucial step in the analysis process involves defining 
attrition rates for a particular fiscal year. In this 
thesis attrition rates for a fiscal year are computed as the 
percentage of attrition among the accessions for that fiscal 
year. Note that attrition can occur i n the next fiscal year 
and that recruits who attrited in the fiscal year of 
interest but who accessed in the previous year are not 
included. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES 
DEP length, accession date, and attrition date are 
important in determining trends for lET losses and in 
understanding how to fit the model. These variables give 
ins ight into determining yearly, seasonal and monthly 
effects relating to attrition and recruiting. Figure 1 
shows that during fiscal years 1990 to 1993 lET attrition 
reached an average of 8.7 percent of the tota I number of 
accessions. I t is interesting to note that these 
percentages differ from the six month attrition rates 
reported by the DeSPER manpower section over this same 
period. The differences may be attributed to the length of 
i3 
time, from a c cession te discharge , wh i ch the soldiers Clre 
being t::-Clcked. 
PERCENT lET ATTRITION 
1:·mlJ 
Figure 1 lET Attrition Rates to r FY 90 - 93 
This r ep~rt conccntra~_ cs on the IET p e riorl wh ich l asts 
on averClge from fou.c to six months depending on the MOS of 
the soldier. DeSPER'" manpower sect i on URe'S the Cubert 
Target ing System (CTS) , w~ich tracks e ach so l d i er up until a 
specif ied period of time , in this case six months . 
resul t , the CTS reports a larger number of att.citions .:lnd 
shows higher a t t:::-ition rates L"1an t his study . This wa s .:In 
i mportant consideration in d e t e cLing trends of lET attrition 
a !ld in de t ermining if the data sets for t he study were 
c omplete and l og i cC\ ::' . 
The aver.ag e time an individua l spe:1L i:1 che DEP for dl l 
1ST discharges by y ear is given in Figure 2. \,'e see that. t_he 
avera g e DEP l engths had b een d 0creasing steadily u:lti l FY 
1992 when a l a rge p ool of high school seniors were accessed 
AVERAGE TIME SPENT IN OEP FOR COHORT'S 90-93 
~1!lJ FY91 EJ FY92 Eilll FY93 I 
Figure 2 Average Time in DEP [or 3ach Year 
int o the Army based on a pol icy change in DA which open pd up 
t he recruit_j ng market to seniors [ Re f . 1] . '1'.:-. i s decreasing 
I:T e nd cO:ltinued in FY 199 3 reach i ng the lowps t average DEP 
time of any y ear cons i de red. 
Figure 3 suggests chat up c o a certain time there ~s an 
inverse celat i cnship betwee n the amount of time a cOhort 
spends i n t. he DEP and t he risk. of becoming dll lET attrit ion 
s t_ a,::istic . The propor t iollali'::y differpncps dre contrary to 
what: occuJ:s in DEP loss, wh ""J:e it has been shown that as 
Tiale in DEP incJ:eases t:"1e C:lance of becoming a DEP l oss also 
This relationship WdS discuss""d during ead y 
lET ATTRITION BY TIME IN DEP 
FY90-93 
9.5 
~ 9 .'"'. 
;:: "~\ -;;:;c ~ 8.5 S 
~ 8 v -
7.5 
I I:'MEIN DEP IMONTHSII ,I, ' I' 5 5 Tel e TO " T2 
'f" ATTR ITIONS . 9.27 19.06 1871 ]8.5018.73 17747.92788
18.17 ,794'845 8,5a 
-Flgure 3 ~y 98 93 lET Attrltlon by Tl me In OBP 
research conducted by Budd i n in 1981 [Ref . 1:] <lnd again by 
Flyer and Elster in 1983 [Ref.12] . Fi gure 3 showR t i:Jdt 
t.here is a per i od of time in DEP, between C - 6 months, when 
lET attrition rates are mostly decreasing . The attrition 
rate reaches its lowest point W;len an individua l spends at 
least 6 rr.onths in t.he DEP. From 7 - 12 mont:,s L"1£< attritior. 
rates fluctuate b ut seerr, to be gradual l y increasing. 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
cUlj. DEP relat_'o?lships Figc.re.; veriEiea tr3t gFnder has 
si']nifiCdnt inpac:: OL :-aLe> dllri nq IET, and so 
re:n,) <ire aboc.t 4 percent hi']r.er L10-n far :nales. 
lET Attrition by Gender 
Figure 4 =3':' 1'.L· clLlo:1 by 
is i:C-lte:::-ec;ting ::0 r:otice ::ha:: tr.e tr-ends seer: J.:1 
1 Cina 4 are fcllowe:l by bolh cler::ier;;, do; slnwn in 
1;'igc.re 5. :--iere bu::h sexes di splCly sim:'lar decrea."ic,:; 
attri::ia;1 "'O-tes up tc s::'x or seve:1 rr.o;1ths :'..n the DEP. 
the scvcn·:n:Jntll Fuln:: L1C' dt:::::-i::ior: r-o.tC8 fL.lctuate DC.t_ 
re:no.i:l r-C'~dtiv'cCly stC'ddy ·..lIltil tll<2 ::c:lth :nontc. where aJa:'..n 
accessed [rom FY90 - 93, only 2408 (less :: han 5 p e r cent:) 
experienced DEF leng t hs over eight m:m t: hs. This he l tl s 
explain ::he vdriahi l i t y shown by the fema Jp recruit s ~:) DE P 
mon th s 3· .l.2 of t he graph . 
lET ATTRITION BY TIME IN DEP AND GENDER 
FY90-93 
nME IN DE PIMONTIiS) 1 1 2 :} .. 5 I B I 1 8 9 10 11 12 
[MALES __ -_ 8.51 6.47 7_5161 792] 8.391 7.10! 7.53 7.41:e .oo 7~ , a39 847 
IFE YALE S " 13. 0~.221215i1 101 1 '06"O ,88 1 0.1911 . 41! 9.6 7 11.88 9.92 12. 1$ 
F ~ gure 5 IE'!' Attr lt- lon cy '!' lme In DEP Clnd Gender 
I ET att:::-ition for var i ous educat ion level s at t he tirr.e 
signi ng the en .! is tment contraC t i s given i n Figure 6 . HS 
SENIOR st-a n ds f or High School students W:lO are i n their 
senio r y ea r and will gradua t e i n twe l v e or less rrr.Hlths. 
GRAD a re t h ose contracts who ho ld a Hi gh Schoo l Dipl oma. 
GED con tract s are individuals who have earned a h i g h school 
d iploma th rough an e quiva l ency program . PRIOR SERVICE ore 
perso:me l who have s erv ed time in any o f the :ni litary 
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services . and t.he rema:i ni n3 cont.ract.;,; are non graduates. 
referred tc as a NON - GiUill. I t i s ~mpo Tt:.ant to note t. ha t the 
num,')er of ind:'.vidtlals acc oss(,'d in each of tl-,ese g y ouE-ls 
lET ATTRITION BY EDUCATION STATUS 
20 ,-------------------------
FY90-93 
!!ill HS SENIOR f£l HS GRAD 0 GED 
lEi PRIOR SERVICE I!llI NON-GRAD 
Fig ure 6 lET ACtri ~ion by Educat. lona l Scatus 
vast l y di:fe r e n C. Vfn i l e it is Crue Chac NON GRAD aed GED 
cacegorie s have mu ch higher l ET a t trition rates, Fi.gure 7 
"haws tha t t:he number o f accessions in t hese t wo cat.egor ies 
do n o t h a v e a great impact Oil the popula t ion, .'is SENIOR , 
HS GRAD a n d PR I OR SERVTCE cat.egories make uE-l dbout 9 7 
percent. of the total acces s ion 90pu l ation. As s u c h , the 
modeling effort will concentrate on t h(,' l dSt three 
categories ment i oned to expla i n lET actr it. ion . 
ACCESSIONS BY ED. LEVEL 
[] HSGrms III ~ 
~ GED C 
Figure 7 Number of Accessions Per Year by Education 
The DA accession mi ssion sper.ifies the numbel:' of 
i nd i viduals who must access in:..o or enter t:-Je Army as wel l 
as t he proportion of recruits in various categories . Tabl e 
TV summarizes the accession mission for 1991 [Ref. 8, Table 
I ]. and shCJws that less t han 5 percent of the tota l 
accession mission is from GED aod NON-GRAD categories . 
This is similar to the i;iccession missions for each of the 
years from FY 1990 to FY 1993. 
A1.:other variable exp l ored was race, Figure 8 shows 
that w'lit.es have higher ,Jttrition rates th<:l o a oy of the 
other races in the four years considered. This is not 
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surprising, since , ... hites gene rally have more job 
oppcrtunities out_5 1- de the mil'itary, accorcing t o survey 
Table IV 1994 DA ACCESSION MISS IO:\' 
Quality 
Gender 
to scores be t-ween 
results ccmductec hy USAREC . Figu re 9 illust .::ates that 
the aVf'rage age for WHI TES may be scmewhat lower than the 
o~_ h e r races, th'JS e xpld ining wb y theil:" attrition rdt.e i s 
higher. DeSPER analysts saw simi lar enlis t ment t rends upon 
f' x aminir.g interview responses fro:n Lhe 1993 DoD Survey o f 
Personne l Ente.::ing the Mi l itary Service (AFEESJ. 
One recruiting tech:1ique used by USA..'\.EC to enhance 
certain j obs and influence undecided possible recrui t. s is 
t;,e en listment bonus. The nUIl'.ber of bonus recipien ts has 
dwindled conside .::ably since 1990 when over 10,000 bonuses 
OlltaineC [:r'om 1 993 
resu l ts, which targets 
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T'::'acking Surve y l YATS ) 
lET ATTRITION BY RACE FOR EACH YEAR 
12 1°lliUml z Q 8 !~~ ' _1 
I FY90-93 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 
IVvH1TE 8.88 10.10 10.15 9.48 
BLACK .1 5.95 6 .82 6 .81 7.41 
HISPANIC[] 5.32 6.51 5.87 6 .85 
OTHER 0 6 .75 6.83 7.30 6 .55 
Figure , LET Attrilion by Race For Years (FY 90-93) 
'" I 
j 1 iU + .;81 :: W.Lr-=____cc-',~-=---±cc_____cc_,___,,_-co_---" ~: 
IETGIIAOUATE lET FAILURE 
AGE BY RACE BV lET ATTRITIO N STATUS 
Fl.gure 9 30x P10L of Average Age by Race and I3" Status 
were granted at. enli stmen~_ . In FY93 3242 bonus~ s were 
ha:1ded o u t, this is just over 4 perCe,lt of lhe totdl 
popul ation. I t. wou ld seem l i ke ly that these bonus 
:::ecip i ents wou l d have a great-er desire to compl e te their 
tra l ning . Fi gure 10 tells us that just the oppos i t e i s 
I n each FY, p ersonnel acce pt ing a b onus have ,1 
lugher attri tion r at-e than for t flose whu do not rece l ve a 
bonus. 
lET ATTRITION BY BONUS FOR EACH YEAR 
FY90-93 FY90 I FY91 FY92 FY93 
BONUS TAKERS D' 8.71 11071 ,11 .10 1_181 
NON-BONUS TAKERS. 7.75 902 1 902 8.65 
Another- i nter-es t-i ng po i nt for enlistment Demus rece i vers 
is tnaL in each 0: the l ast- four FY's t he lET attr i tion 
rates f or- nonus taker-s i s i nc reasing . Fi':;l"'-1re 11 shows us an 
almos t pe:::fecl i nverse re l atio:1sh~p for bonus takers . 
the t ime in DRP in::::reases , the chan:::: e o f lET attrition 
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d"cr"ases . Since en listment bonuses are primarily used tc 
enco"J.rage e nl istments in less desirable occupations, it is 
necessa:-y to CO:1duct an analysi s of milicary job skil l s or 
MOS'S which may he l p exp l ain che bO:1uS phenomenon . 
lET ATTRITION BY TIME IN DEP 
BONUS vs. NON-BONUS 
FY90-93 
14 
z 12 - - j ~'f~~~~ 
The data contained in the mini·master fi l e u nder the 
variable heading mas consists of a two digit number 
followed by a letter. This number/lette:- code identifies 
the MaS of ei;lch enlistee. Table V shows a list of c:omha:;. 
arms branches and their corresponding MaS codes . i\ complete 
listing of these MaS ' s and t heir spp:cific operational 
skills are found in many of the Army'>; publications like the 
24 
Table V CombaL Ar.ms MOS ' s 
~ BRANCHES_O~ 
Aviation (AV) 
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) 
Armor Il\R) 
Engineer (EN) 
Field Artillery (FA) 
I nEa.ntry (IN) 
spec ia l Forces (SF) 
>=-CQIOO1 
l1J 
1 6E - 1 6 X 
19 D - 19X 
12B-17 F 
UB - D R 
18B - :R F 
Enl i sted Rankt,· Updale. ::< i gu re 12 ill ustrates that about 
hal f of the total accession mi ss i on for each year is made of 
CU!1lDat arms MJS' s. 
ACCESSION BY MOS TYPE 









Ci COMBAT NON-COMBAT 
Figure 12 Number of Accessions by MOS Type 
HLstorica l J y, many of the corrba t: related jobs hav e less 
desi=-able occupa t:ional s :<:: i l l s and offer bonuses to :na i ntain 
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required troop strengths. Figure 13 graphically illustrates 
which Mas groups receive the most bonuses and identifies 
certain Mas codes which require further analysis. 
Additional investigation shows that the number o f 
bonuses granted for the Infantry MaS (llB-1 1X) is about one-
fifth of the tota l number of bonuses given. 
BONUS BY MaS CODES 
FY93 
i~-----I ~~" "L _.J.!:, .",J'11'J 
- . - - - - - - -Combat", 11 B·19X Non-Combat '" 33Y·98X 
Fl.g-ure 13 Num er 0 En l.stment Bonus by MOS Co es 
Wi th respect to DEP, high value jobs tend to have longer 
queues. As a result, we would expect that average DEP 
lengths for combat arms branches would be shorter than the 
DEP lengths for non-combat arms branches. Figure 14 
illustrates the average DEP lengths of each of these groups 
and sha'ols that in the past three years the mean DEP lengths 
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:Jf non-cornbClt Cl:c:nS ':'his re[~!,::es L:le prev~uuo; 
hypOLr_esi" a::d shows tr.at there ::'s a g:ceat deal o f 
DEP LENGTH COMPARISON BY MOS TYPE 
7 -
FY90-93 





Figure l4 :vlea:l DEI' ;-,cr.gL.,s Pcr VB. Non cOrIDa,:: MeS 
vari<l..t; ility in yearl y DEP poo-_s lrom year '::0 year 
(' onpF..T ~ 80::lS. Figure l5 atterr.ptB to explain the reLit_ cnsh~p 
.tetwccn combaL and con<~ O[llta'~ a':::TIs c· rancr:es dud thc~r 
at:t_r::':.ion rates :it montt:ly :JC;t' po:'..r:ts. ':'his Figure t-.lrL.:--,er 
exempl i t_he var iabilit_y in ear:r_ mcnt_r_ of GEI' a:ld =hows 
:.I:a.':: e<l.ch 'J:: :.l1e gro~!ps seem have si[j[~ldr <l.tt:::-itiOl: 
pt:ects witr. respect to '::he LJEP. 
S::'nce tr.e combat arms KOS' s are cot l:omoqenC'ouc; too Lhe 
r:()Jl-conillaL a.:::-ms If.OS' s, we will aLLemp'~ m()(lt-'~ t_lipm bO'::.h 
lET ATTRITION BY TIME IN DEP AND MOS 
FY90-93 
10 ,---------------------, 
99.5n ~ 9 .' • . .14. _. ---,:::-; .•~ 8,5 - ~>!; \ 1---7". 
..... .. ! , 
".. 8 L \/'7'~)b.~··-
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Flgure 1 5 lET Attr :l tl::m ny Tlme :to :lEP and MOS 
together in the saturated model a!1d as two separate groups. 
A d e ta i l ed e xplanat i on of the mode l f. i tting process is 
described later in Chapter IV. 
Other demographic variables cO:1sidered as potentia l 
i nd i cators of TET attrition inc l uded age at e n l istment., 
Armed Forces Qualif ica t ior. Test (AFQT ) score, and education 
The ave rage age of someone not complet ing l ET was 
compared to the average age of al l i ncorr,iY1g accessions hy 
yea r. Figure 16 i llustrat es this simple comparison <Ind 
sh:::J'H"S that the average ages of the two groups are alll'.ost 
identica l in each year. This is further- e xerrp l ified by 
taking a random samp l e o[ 50 00 rec:::-uits from all years aEd 
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eemparing the average age of lET fai l ures versus lET 
grJdUaLeS as shewn i n ?igure 17. Th'cls, in i t ial l y the.::e 
appears to be no slgnificant indicaLion of attrition at 
' ... ·he:l age 1 s lneluded in the model . 
AVERAGE AGE COMPARISON 
lET GRADS vs_ lET FAILURES 
25 .---------~~~~---------_=~--~ 
~ 20 
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FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 
FY90·93 
I 0 lET GRADS Ol IET FAILURES I 
Figure 16 Age Comparison, I ET Graduates vs. l ET Failures 
A.:10t11e r varidble considered in previous studies was t h e 
A?QT sco re. This sccre is a com;Josite of a subset of the 
individu,al ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aplitude 
BalLery) component scores, ref l ect_-ing langu age a:1d 
arithmetic s k il l s , df!d is used dS v- measure o f general 
aptitude . Pe.::sons in t:'1e l owest AFOT category (percen<:::iles 
1 through 9) are by 1 a ",' i neligible to enlist [:i.ef . 12J . 
BOXPLOTIN - 5000IFY90·93 
Figure 17 Box Pl ot of Age Compariso:l 
Persons with higher AFQT sco:::-es are e::'igihle to enlist 
but the specific job choices confronLing them depend on 
theil:'" ASVAB componen t score s, such as mechanical, e l ect r ical 
and c l e rical aptitudes. If we view the AFQT score as a 
measure of trainabi.lity, then the higher the score, th e more 
likely the individual will successf'Jlly complete tl:'"aining in 
· .... ha tever skill he enters . Thus, persons wi th high AFQT 
scores are more likely to be eligible for a l arge number of 
h i ghly valued jobs like a computer prog:::-arnmer or a nuclear 
technician . As such, we would e xpect that persons wi th 
hig:'ler AFQT' s should be more adept at their tasks and so 
less likely to be let go during lET . Figure 18 shows lhat 
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the average AFQT score Eor lndividuals making I t through rET 
is almost 2 percent bette~ pe~ ye21 r than persons who attr l te 
d'.lrlng I ET . ':'h15 confirms th e hypothes i s th21t AFQT shou ld 
he used as an a t:trit ion indicator in our model. 
sign i fica:lce t o the model will be discussed l ater . 









FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 
FY90-93 
I 0 lET GRADS [l IET FAILUREQ 
Figure J. 8 Comparing Average AFQT Scores b y Ye21r 
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IV. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
To f :JrthE!r ~tudy the re l ationship between the effect o f 
other facto:::-s in the 03P and rET at_t_ rition, we use t~le 
log i stic regression mode l . Here the respcnse variable is 
t he d i cbc:=:umous variable that indicates whether individuals 
wi l l be lost during rET and the explanatory varLlbles 
inclncte age of en::" i s tee , AFQT score, enlistme:1t bonus , 
ccmbat az:ms MOS, gender , education level, r ace , and time in 
t_ he DEP. No t_e t_hat for the lugistic :::-egression model , the 
binomia l distribution descr~ _ hes t_ he dis t_ ributiun upon which 
the iUld l ysis wi l l :be based. 
A logistic regression model is used to monel the 
re l at i cnship het.ween a dichotomous out-come variab l e Y 
(dependen ::: or response variable) and a set of independent 
(predictor or exp l anatory) vdriables x"x>, .. . ,xp [Re f 13). 
,"or t_he case of a sing l e independent- variable x, the 
l ogistic regression model can be writ_t en as: 
nix) • (l) 
wl-.ere Ii ( x l = E (Y xl and and [:I, are coef fi c ients co be 
estimated from t he data . 
For p pred i ctor variables, x, x , 
regr~ssion mo:iel lS wri t lt'll as: 
II (xl· 
where g (x) is lhe linea:::- combi.natioE: 
the logistic 
(2) 
and where .. . ,f)" are the unknown paramete:::-s to be 
estima ted . 
B. VARIABLE SELECTION 
spss ' ve cs i on 5.1 for Windows, and SAS' vers i on 6 for 
the NPS mainframe , were used to f it :::he mode l . ':'he f :i.rs c 
step of the construct i on process involved data maniIJUla cion 
as discussed i n Chapt er. I I . The datu. was parl.itioned by 
year for each of :::he four years considered in the s t uoy. The 
next step in the pr.ocess invol ved var i ab l e selection. 
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detd~led ernIJiricdl dnalysis of the dernogrdIJ:"lic: va1::"iables was 
'L"le selection p1::"ocess begins ',;ith a caret-,l=- l:eivariate 
cC1Cllysis of eacr_ variable. The u:livcu:iate logis:~c 
reg.:-essior: model ' .. 'as fit t01::" eClc:h yeCl::; sepa::;ately ar.d :01::" 
all yean; (;('):nbir.en fOJ::" eaC::"l of the va::-iablcs ide:1tif'ed 11· 
:no::iel to these da:a fo::; all yeaJ::"s is given ::'r. Table VI. 
vctJ::"iClble with the outcome variable ATTRITIOi'i. 
Tahle VI ('()n~_ainR the follGwic] ir.format.ion: 1 i t.he 
eSL::'I':lated slepe coefficient to.:- tr.e c;.eivdridte legistic 
regression Dodel (;ont-_a~ning only this var~aDle. t:"le 
eStiDdteu standard erJ::"or of the estima::ed s=-oIJe cee:£icieel, 
L"le es:inated odns rat::'c. wr.i(;:"1 is ohtained i:;y 
exponent_iat_ing t_l~e es~_ima~_eli coe"f'cien~_, {4i ~_he value at 
miLUS lwo limes lhe leg-likeliheod for :he medel, (5:' lhe 
likelillOod raLio test sta:..islic, G, wh::'ch Les:..s l:"le r:-.l=-l 
r.ypcthesis constcm: :node=- versus :.he ct=-ternCltive hypethesis 
wit:"l m:e variab Ie, anti 
Table VI UNIVA..'<.IATE LOG I S TI C REGR FSSICN )olCDEL 
~ariable I SE (G ) I - 2 ( Log L ) I I p - v al I 
Const a nt 2 . 3:'2 . 00 6 186927 . 1 
0 . 01 186921. 4 I .5 . 7 4 · 0001 
AFOT 0 . 01 1864)5.1 491 . 9 · 000 1 
30NUS ·0. :< O . 02 0 . 9 44. 5 7 . 0001 
COMBAT . . 02 5 .02 7 0.99 186 '13 2 .7 1 94 . 43 · 0001 
GENDER 0. 4 1 0 . 02 186294 . 5 
HS SENIOR 0 . 08 O. 02 1..1 186896.1 30.9 5 · OUC: 
HS GRlID - n.2 C. 01 186720 .5 206. f. .0001 
PR IORSER 1. 94 .067 6 . 93 185249.8 1.6 77 . 3 .OC01 
BLAC K ().3 5 O. Q2 186454.8 477..3 .00 01 
HI SPAt'iIC .4 02 . C30 1. 49 186 7 29 . 7 
OTEER 0 . 27 O. 04 1. 3 1 868 '1 9.9 47 . 23 · UOOI 
0 . 0:< 1 86677 . :, 49.61 
Variabl es were s e l e c c:ed tor the mu l tivariat e ana lysis it 
the ir ,mivar i ate tests yield p - values ot less than 0.05 . 
All o ( the v ariables r:hcsen had p - valu e s less t ha~l 0 . 05 w:'1en 
mode : ing the yea r s both combiEed and separately, e xcept in 
FY9? when four variab l es ; HS GRAD. HS SENIOR, AGE, a:lG 
Tl"MEDEP displayed p · val'.les greater t han 0.0 5 . Table VII 
displays the va riables wi t h p - values grea Ler than 0.05 whe n 
conducting ~. he u Il ivariat.e analysis in F Y92 . Clea r ly I\G E and 
':'IMEDEP an" :i. :l s:i.gni f~cant f or FY92 , but s Lnce t.he ir p-values 
) 5 
are less than 0.05 for all years other than this one, they 
will be initially included in the multivariate model. 
Table VII UNIVARIATE MODEL FOR FY92 
Variables p-value 
HS GRAD -0.053 3.3 0.0712 
HS SENIOR -0.057 3.768 0.0513 
AGE 0.0027 0.4871 
Table VIII shows the variables selected at the onset of 
fitting the multivariate model. The model contains all of 
the variables from Table VI except for those already 
identified from the empiracle analysis as having little or 
no impact on lET attrition, and includes any felt to have 
some effect on the outcome when all the variables are 
included together. This will be called the full model in 
our discussion. 
The importance of each variable included in the model 
was verified by comparing the estimated coefficient from the 
univariate model containing on l y that variable, with the 
coefficient from the full mUltivariate model. 
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Table VIII LIST OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL VARIABLES 
TYPE 
Age of continuous, No NUMERICAL 
enlistee Level 
Enlistment BONUS Yes, No (1,0) CATEGORICAL 
Bonus 
Time in DEP TIMEDEP 1, .. .,12 ORDINAL 
Gender Male""1, CATEGORICAL 
Female =0 
Ethnic Race MCE White, Black, CATEGORICAL 
Hispanic, Other 
(0, ... ,J) 
Armed Forces AFQT Continuous ORDINAL 
Qual if ication Scale, No Level 
Test 
Education NBOX HSGRAD, HSSENI OR , CATEGORICAL 
Level P RIORSER (1-23 ) 
Training MOS TMOS Combat, Non- CATEGORICAL 
All variables in Table IX hilve Wald statistics with very 
small (less than 0.001) p-values. Therefore, all of the 
variables are left in the model. 
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Table I X MULTIVARIATE ~ODEL SELECTION COMPARISON 
Var ia.ble ~ $ Wa ld p-va l u e 
Univariate 
0.01 -0,02 60 .0001 
AFQT 0 . 01 
B8l\-US - 0.2 - 0 . 16 .0001 
COMBAT - 0.03 ·0 . 05 12 . 0005 
O. <:;0 831 .00 01 
HS SENIOR 0 . 08 
'8 GRAD - 0.21 0 . 48 238 . 0001 
PR I ORS ER 1. 94 2.45 . 0001 
0 . 35 0 . 61 ,0001 
HISPl\NI C :) . 40 O. fi3 . 000 : 
0. 2 7 0.49 146 .000 1 
0.02 O . 01 .000 .1 
C . F I TTI NG 
SAS prcv i:1.cs t wo criteria t or. assessing mOde l fit. the y 
ar-e t he Score sta t i stic , and the r.e sidual deviance G. l'his 
deviar, ce measure is -2 times the di ff erence of the log-
like l ihood of the fit t ed and the model with just the 
i ntercept on l y, T~e rat i o between G and - 2 times the log-
l ikelihood of t he intercept onl y model , known as t he 
l i ke l ihood ratio inde x is a l so used to agsC'sg the fit of t h e 
mode l . This index is similar to R ' in mu l tiple regression 
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and provides a measure of how much of t he va riab ility i n t he 
data i s ex:tJ l ained by tr,e variables in the fitted model, 
The statistic G Les t. s the null hypothesis of the 
i :1tercepl mode l versus t he alter":1at i ve of c he :nedel of 
Ur.der the nu l l hypothesis, and wClen the samp l e 
size is large , G has an ilpproximacely X: discribution with p 
degrees of freedo['\ , .... here p is the number of var iables in t:'le 
model under che alternative hypothesis. T:'le refo re, if the 
medel f i t is good, asymptotically lhe expected deviance i s p 
Re f . 14] . 
?or the mode l uIlde.::· consideration the G stati s tic is 
4740.332 with 12 degrees of freedom and a p - value o f 0.0001. 
Th1s indicates that these variables exp l ain more vil riilbi l ity 
i:1 attrition rate than does the constant medel. On the 
other hand, the likelihood ratio index i s ; 
• 0.025, 
so that most of the variability ::'n atrxi tion rates is s ti ll 
unexp l ained by these variables . Several more mo1e l s were 
fit w~'lich included interact jon t erms bt:t none o f these r.ew 
variables had s t.atistical ly significant p-values. As such 
t.hey were not added co the fina l model. 
In an atterqJt t.o 1'10del the decrease and then the 
increase in attrition as a function of time iIl DE:,,>, a 
quadrat i c and a cubic t e rlf' were fie. The lik.elihood ratio 
statistic fu r the quadratic tprlf' i s 47.39 with 1 
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degree of freedom and a p-value of less than 0.0001. Adding 
a cubic term gives a likelihood ratio statistic (testing the 
null mode l with just the linear time DEP term versus the 
alternative model with the quadratic and cubic terms) of 
0.45 with 1 degree of freedom a n d a p-value of 0.50 . 
TI MEDEP was also categorized into three levels, 0-6 
months, 7-9 months and 10-12 months. These 3 l eve l s were 
coded as the t wo variables TI MEDEP1 , Which is 1 if TIMEDEP is 
between 0 and 6 months and TIMEDEP2 , which is 1 if TIMEDEP 
is between 7 to 9 months. These levels were c hosen by 
looking at the plots of attrition versus TIMEDEP (eg . Figure 
3 and Figure 5) which tend to be decreasing for TIMEDEP less 
than 6 months and increasing for TIHEDEP greater than 10 
months. 
The G statistic for TIMEDEP with three levels is 4729.3 
with 13 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.0001. Because 
the G statistic with TIHEDEP added to be a numeric variable 
with a quadratic term is larger than the G statistic with 
TIMEDEP as a categorical variable, the polynomial version of 
TIMEDEP is used in the final model. 
D. FIliAL MODEL 
The final model can be parameterized as: 
is Lhe p :- ::.bability of lET attrition for 
~ndividuals ::.f a speci f ic agc (AGE) and with a speci f i e AFO? 
score (A?QT) am: w~ere j 1 , 2 for !Jonus recipients 
respectively (D. 3 0); k = 1,2 f o r cCmba t "Ind non - combat 
MOS respeccive l y (Gc = 0) ; 1 * 1 ,2 fa.:: males and f emal es 
respec t ]. v e l y -= 0); m _ 1 ,2,3,4 for Other, Black, 
Hi. spanic and White respect i ve ly { ~ ,' -= 0) ; V and the 
coefficients fo r lhe continuous variables AGE and AFQT 
score; n - 1 , 2,3,4 f::.r high schoo l senio.::, r,igh school 
graduate and prior serv ice and other res pectiv e l y (p ; -= 0) . 
Tab l e X give" the estimated coefficients as well t.heir 
standa.::d errors, "'ald Sti'ltis::ics, odds ratio and p - valu c s . 
We note thi'l t attempts at cat egorizin'J A.::< QT and a d ding 
o ther var i ab l es describing MOS such as sepa r ating Infantry 
MOS from the o t h ers did not improve mod!"l fit . Models with 
three- way or h i gher in t eractio ns were not tried b e cause they 
are a:'..mos t ill'.possible ::0 fit computatior,al l y d nd because it 
was fe l t t.ha:: fur t her terms wO":.lld n8 t shed any more light on 
the re la tionships between these variables and lET attrit~on 
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Table X FINAL MODEL OUTPUT 
variable 13 SEI'BJ Wald I p - villIue 
0.866 0.066 177 .6 2.38 · COOl 
p, " i BONUS) - 0 .152 0.024 39.7 0.86 .0001 
; (COMBAT) 0 . 047 0.015 10.7 0.95 · 0011 
G, ' (MA L E) 0.499 O. 017 842.9 1. 65 .0001 
I 13,' (OTHER) 0.486 O. 040 1. 63 .0001 
G, " {BLACK) 0.609 O. 018 1152.5 1. 81 · 0001 
G ," (HISPANIC) 0.623 O. 030 1 .8 6 . 0001 
13 ' (AGE) · 0. 018 0.002 58.6 0.98 .0001 
I E;" (AFQT) O. 012 0.001 928.5 1. 01 .0001 
13 ,' (HSSENICR) 0.451 0.037 148.0 1. 57 · 0001 
G I (HSGRAD) 0.476 0.031 233.8 1. 62 .0001 
G, ' (PRIORSER) 2.467 0 . 074 1123.7 11. 79 .0001 
G," (TIMEDEP) 0.058 O. 007 66.4 1. 06 .0001 
B," (TIMEDEP) ; -0.004 0.001 48.0 l.00 · 0001 
E. RESULTS 
This model described in Equat ion (5) was fit separately 
fo r male and females, combat versus non-combat MOS's. and 
Infantry versus non-Infantry MOS's for all years. 
Additionally, this base model was fit for each year 
independently. 
The model identified several different trends and 
variable aspec t-. s with respect to attrition from year to year 
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but fai l ed to exp l ain mucD of the var i a nc e i nvo l ved. The 
t:est fit of a l l these attempt" han a like l ih80d ratio i ndex 
cf aDout 0 035. Because this index is so low, ie o n Ly 3 . 5 
peJ:cent of t r,e va r la:)i ll ty in attrition rates is explained 
b y t he model, concluCliuns a nd recommendat ions are based on 
graphical and e:npirical results given in the 9revious 
o:;ection. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
The dramatic increase in first-term attrition observed 
over the past few years was not seen for lET attritions. In 
fact, lET attritions have decreased slightly over the past 
two years. As a whole, the time a potential recruit spends 
in the Delayed Entry Program is not as significant an 
indicator of attrition as some other aspects of enlistment. 
However, on the average, most groups that have higher 
attrition rates tend to spend less time in the DEP. 
almost every category of recruit, lET attrition rates are 
lowest for cohorts spending between six to eight months in 
the DEP. The attrition rates tend to increase for cohorts 
spending less than six months and greater than 8 months in 
the DEP. On average, personnel who spent one month or less 
on DEP had the highest attrition rates during Initial Entry 
Training. 
Recruits who accept enlistment bonuses are more likely 
to attrite than those who do not accept bonuses. Whites 
have higher attrition rates than any of the other races, 
although for blacks, attrition rates have been increasing 
over the past four years. Females have higher attrition 
rates than males but exhibit similar distributions for DEP 
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time. Enlistees who score above 60 on their AFQT have a 
much greater chance of completing lET than someone who 
scored lower than 60. 
Combat Arms MaS's have an overall lower average 
attrition rate and longer average DEP lengths although the 
trend for the last two years has seen the opposite. The 
I nfantry MaS's access almost half of the total combat arms 
MOS's. Although the attrition rates for Infantry MOS's are 
about 3 percent higher than for non-combat MOS's, over the 
past two years, their attrition rates over all years are 
similar to the lET popUlation in general. The final 
conclusion is that there are many factors in the enlistment 
process, such as AFQT score, gender and education level, 
which explain more about lET attrition then the time an 
individual spends in the OEP. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increase the minimum DEP length to at least three 
months, but no more than ten months. 
The longer DEP periods apply more directly to high 
school seniors, who exhibit lower attrition rates on average 
than any other education l evel. Still, by eliminating DEP 
periods of over 10 months their attrition rates during lET 
and dur ing OEP would be lower . 
Eliminate onlistment bonuses or open more enlistment 
bonus areas to mor e higher valued jobs. 
4S 
As it stands, the Army is losing on both accounts with 
enlistment incentives because they are paying the bonuses to 
recruits more likely to exit the service during lET. 
Increase the role a recruiter plays in the DEP 
training of signed contracts. 
This might even include a mandatory follow-up check by 
the recruiter at an lET training site to track soldiers he 
contracted for their first six months of training. This 
type of recruiter/recruit tracking is currently being 
conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps recruiters. 
Finally, 4. Limit the number of training cycles or 
distribute the accession dates over the year to smooth out 
the seasonal fluctuations in training. 
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